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this to the maker's discretion by allowing him not to produce it at the trial
if he does not wish to. Finally, if the maker incurs expenses in defending
the suit, or if his reputation suffers by reason of the bad faith suit, com-
pensation may be allowed him in a tort action for wrongful civil proceedings
which is now allowed in the majority of American jurisdictions,8 3 although
a hard case to prove.
CONCLUSION
The confusion in the cases concerning acceleration clauses today is
due to the attempts of the courts to solve these problems within the "time
certainty" rubric of the NIL. This is unfortunate in that their reason for
denying negotiability in many cases is their objection to the clause itself,
although paradoxically the clause is almost invariably enforced, With this
realization, the cases can be categorized according to the factual situation
the clause describes. The more it portrays a pending inability on the part
of the maker to pay, the greater the chance that the note will be held
negotiable, and vice versa.84 Thus it seems that principles analogous to the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation are those used in deciding whether to
impose the only sanction available under the NIL, non-negotiability. The
Code recognizes that the problem is one of enforceability and provides that
no acceleration clauses destroy negotiability.85 It applies the doctrine in
the case of power to accelerate "at will" or "when the holder deems himself
insecure," only allowing exercise of the power in the good faith belief that
the prospects of payment are impaired. This is a step forward as far as
the Code expressly applies. It is urged that the Code be construed so as
to forbid any acceleration if the facts relied upon to accelerate do not show
an inability to pay, or an impairment of that ability, in the good faith belief
of the holder.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
The source and authority of the military law of this country is the
Constitution which empowers Congress "to make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and "to define and punish
. Offenses against the Law of Nations," 1 and constitutes the President
83. See PROSSMR, TORTS 885-892 (1941).
84. Compare, however, the situations described in text at note 59 supra.
85. A big problem to corporations is to have their bonds drafted so that accelera-
tion clauses, if any, do not destroy negotiability. Article III does not apply to in-
vestment securities (§3-103(1)). Article VIII governs them, and problems of
negotiability were thought to be of no more consequence; however, in response to
the desire to make securities eligible for investments under certain state acts providing
that, to be "legal," investments must be negotiable instruments, a new section [§ 8-
105] has been proposed. That section reads: "(1) Securities governed by this Article
are negotiable instruments." See Recommendations of the Editorial Board for
Changes in the Text of the Uniform Commercial Code 14 (Dec. 29, 1952).
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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as the Commander-in-Chief and makes it his duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. 2 It also inferentially recognizes courts-martial by
relieving these tribunals of the requirement of an indictment of a Grand
Jury.3 The Uniform Code of Military Justice,4 establishing the present
unified system of military law for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, was
enacted by Congress on May 5, 1950.5 Pursuant to Article 36 of the Code,6
the President published the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951,7 containing the procedure, including modes of proof and rules of
evidence, for courts-martial. The United States Court of Military Ap-
peals, consisting of three civilian judges, established by the Code for review
of matters of law in court-martial cases has held that "the act of Congress
(the Code) and the act of the Executive (the Manual) are on the same
level" 8 and'"will be regarded as sharing a similar authoritative position." 9
This Note will examine the rules of search and seizure contained in the
Manual as applied and interpreted by the boards of review 10 and the
United States Court of Military Appeals."
Affecting any discussion of admissible evidence is the introductory
paragraph of the Rules of Evidence chapter of the Manual which provides
that the following sources of authority are to be referred to in the order
given until a rule of evidence is found: the Manual; the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts; and the common law.1"  Prior to the Manual for Courts-
2. U.S. CoxsT. Art. II, §§ 2, 3.
3. U.S. CoxsT. AxzEN. V.
4. Hereinafter referred to as the Code and cited as U.C.M.J.
5. 64 STAT. 108-145 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§551-736 (Supp. 1952), effective May 31,
1951.
6. 64 STAT. 120 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 611 (Supp. 1952).
7. Hereinafter referred to as the Manual and cited as M.C.M., 1951.
8. United States v. Lucas, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1951). In subse-
quent citations the following abbreviations will be used: Ct. of Mil. App. for Court
of Military Appeals; A for Army; N for Navy; AF for Air Force; Bd. of Rev.
for Board of Review; Jud. Council for Judicial Council; C.M. for Court-Martial;
C.M.R. for Court Martial Reports; B.R. for Board of Review Reports. Also OSI
for Office of Special Investigations; CID for Criminal Investigations Division; MP
for military police; JAG for Judge Advocate General.
9. United States v. Lonnenschein, 1 C.M.R. 64, 67 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1951).
10. All cases involving death, dismissal, discharge or confinement for one year
or more must be reviewed by a board of review, composed of lawyers, which has
authority to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, determine con-
troverted questions of fact, and affirm only such findings of guilty and such sentences
as it finds correct in law and fact and determines on the basis of the record should
be approved. M.C.M., 1951, 1 100.
11. The Court of Military Appeals provides the last appellate review of court-
martial cases. It takes action only with respect to matters of law and it reviews
all cases involving death, cases which the Judge Advocate General forwards to this
Court and cases where the Court has granted review upon petition of the accused.
For a discussion of the organization of the courts-martial system under the Code, see
MULLALLY, Military Ju1stice: The Uniform Code in Action, 53 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1953).
12. M.C.M., 1951, c. 27.
13. This prescribed procedure was followed with approval by the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Slozes, 1 C.M.R. 47, 51 (Ct. of Mil. App.
1951).
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Martial, 1949, no mention was made of searches and seizures and illegally
obtained evidence in any courts-martial manual, although evidence obtained
by illegal searches has been excluded from court-martial cases for a long
time.1 4  Realizing the importance of the subject, the draftsmen of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951, which is the manual now in effect, set
forth in greater detail the rules pertaining to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure and listed some
examples of lawful military searches. 15 These rules are patterned after the
rules of search and seizure applied in our federal courts; however, there is
an essential difference in their practical application. In the military system
the power to determine whether a search should be made and the power to
execute a search or direct its execution is in one person-the commanding
officer.16 In civil jurisdictions the determination of what searches and
seizures are permissible is made by a neutral and detached magistrate who
has no power alone to execute a search.
17
While in the early military cases 1s the legality of a search was deter-
mined by deciding whether the accused's rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment were violated, the recent cases 19 emphasize that military personnel
have no substantive constitutional right against unreasonable searches, but
are protected only by procedural rules of evidence.20 In search cases not
specifically covered by the Manual, reference must be made to the rules ap-
plied in the federal courts, which rules appear to be based on an exercise
of judicial fiat.21 An accused has no remedy if the military appellate courts
refuse to enforce the Manual or federal search rules, since the court-martial
system is not part of the federal judicial system but is a separate and in-
dividual system of justice like that of the state courts. 22 The rules of evi-
14. DIGEST OF OPINIONS, JAGA 1912-1930 § 1304(27) (1932).
15. M.C.M., 1951, 152.
16. United States v. Florence, 5 C.M.R. 48, 51 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952); United
States v. Worley, 3 C.M.R.(AF) 424, 442 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950). This authority
of the commanding officer is limited to property located within a military installa-
tion or property under the control of an armed force.
17. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ; United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932).
18. DIGEST OF OPINIONS, JAGA 1912-1930 §1304(27) (1932); MEMORANDUM
OPINIONS, JAGA 1949-50 352 (1950).
19. United States v. Dupree, 5 C.M.R. 93, 96 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952) ; United
States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R. 773, 777 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
20. Possibly this shift in attitude was occasioned by Supreme Court statements
regarding the plenary powers of Congress over the armed forces and the Court's
insistence that military personnel had to look to the military law for their due process.
Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) ; Wurfel, Military Duw Process, 6
VAND. L. REv. 251, 281 (1953).
21. See Perlman, Duw Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARy. L.
REv. 1304, 1306 (1951) ; Comment, 58 YAIE L.J. 144 (1948). Any constitutional au-
thority upon which the federal rules regarding searches might be based, inure to
military personnel by indirection in those cases not covered by the Manual. See text
at note 13 supra.
22. it re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161, 162
(5th Cir. 1945).
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dence pertaining to searches and seizures established by the Supreme Court
under its supervisory power over the federal judicial system cannot be
used to permit the federal judiciary to control the admission of evidence
in the state courts. By analogy, it is reasonably certain that no such control
exists over the courts-martial. 23  Resort to a review by habeas corpus of a
court-martial conviction based upon evidence procured by an illegal search
and seizure should prove futile since the only question on such review is
whether the court-martial had jurisdiction.24  Certainly a violation of a
procedural rule of evidence would not be such a gross violation of an
accused's rights so as to give rise to a defect in the jurisdiction of the
court-martial. 25
EVIDENCE INADAISSIBLE UNDER THE MANUAL
f 152 provides that:
"Evidence is inadmissible against the accused if it was obtained
as a result of an unlawful search of his property conducted or instigated
by persons acting under authority of the United States, or if it was
obtained under such circumstances that the provisions of Section 605
of the Communications Act of 1934,26 . . . pertaining to the un-
authorized divulgence of communications by wire or radio, would pro-
hibit its use against the accused were he being tried in a United States
district court.2 7  All evidence obtained through information supplied
by such illegally obtained evidence is likewise inadmissible.2 8  For
example, evidence obtained by a lawful search is inadmissible if that
search was conducted because of information derived from a preceding
unlawful search of the kind mentioned above." 
29
23. Even if this rule of evidence is grounded upon the Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ments, since these amendments do not directly apply to the states, the rules of evi-
dence based on the Fourth Amendment can not be forced on the states. Similarly,
since the Fourth or Fifth Amendments do not apply to the military, the same result
obtains.
24. Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 VAND. L. REv.
288, 295 (1953). The jurisdiction of a court-martial is conditioned upon the follow-
ing requisites: that the court-martial was properly constituted, that it had jurisdiction
over the accused and the offense with which he is charged; and that the sentence was
one authorized by law. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950) ; Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
25. Accord, Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110 (1950).
26. 36 STAT. 1103 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §391 (1946).
27. This provision was based on Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
See LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, M.C.M., 1951 240.
28. This provision stemmed from the rulings of the Supreme Court in Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919) and Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). See United States v. Rhodes, C.M. 354858 (A Bd. of
Rev., Sept. 8, 1952). The rule should not be confused with that applying to in-
voluntary confessions. M.C.M., 1951, 1 140a expressly adopts the majority rule by
providing that the circumstance that an involuntary admission or confession "furnished
information which led to the discovery of pertinent facts will not be a reason for
excluding evidence of such pertinent facts."
29. This section of the Manual further provides that, since courts-martial have
no authority to order a return to the accused of illegally seized evidence or to im-
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Searches Without Authorization.-No definition of an unlawful search
is given in the Manual, but the applicable rule is theoretically that imposed
by federal court decisions which are grounded upon the constitutional
prohibition against "unreasonable searches." 80 The Court of Military
Appeals, accepting the principle that the fundamental inquiry is whether
the search is unreasonable, expressly adopted 31 the Supreme Court's view
that "what is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula" but "must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each
case." 32 However, the Court of Military Appeals appears willing to find
'Freasonableness" in situations never indorsed by the federal courts or the
boards of review.3 3  In United States v. Doyle 34 a Navy master-at-arms
(a noncommissioned officer assigned under the executive officer for the
maintenance of good order and discipline) had been previously informed
by a seaman that accused, who had been arrested earlier in the day as a
result of another incident, had iti his locker a pair of the seaman's shoes.
The Court of Military Appeals found that under those circumstances the
master-at-arms' action in searching accused's locker without the command-
ing officer's authorization was reasonable under existing military and navy
law. The court stated that since an eyewitness had informed the master-at-
arms that accused had in his possession the clothing of another, there was
reasonable and probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed
by petitioner. The three federal cases cited by the court for this proposi-
pound such evidence, objection is properly made at the time the prosecution at-
tempts to introduce such evidence. This makes inapplicable the rule originally ap-
plied by federal courts that a proper motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence
must be made prior to trial. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Garhart
v. United States, 157 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1946). This rule was later changed to
permit the motion at the trial where the fact of seizure was first known at the trial.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The present federal rule is that the
trial court may accept an application made for the first time at trial, despite previous
knowledge. FED. R. CRim. P. 41 (e); United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818 (2d
Cir. 1947), aff'd 332 U.S. 581 (1948). Failure to object at the trial to the reception
in evidence of the products of an unlawful search is fatal to a consideration of the
objection on appeal in both military and federal courts. United States v. Dupree,
5 C.M.R. 93, 97 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952); Butler v. United States, 153 F.2d 993
(10th Cir. 1946) ; Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 875 (1945).
30. United States v. Dupree, 5 C.M.R. 93, 96 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952) (since
the rule which excludes from evidence the product of an unlawful search "is derived
from the Federal practice, it may be inferred that all-certainly most-of the restric-
tions imposed on its application in a civilian setting will be operative in the area of
courts-martial procedure.")
31. United States v. Doyle, 4 C.M.R. 137, 139 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952).
32. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
33. Thus it is apparent that while the federal rules are the measuring stick in the
military courts, the same results will not necessarily obtain. So far all federal cases
involving military searches have found them reasonable. E.g., Best v. United States,
184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. deied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951); Richardson v.
Zuppann, 81 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 174 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1949);
Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943) ;
Grewe v. France, 75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Wis. 1948). But cf. United States v.
Florence, 5 C.M.R. 48, 51 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952).
34. 4 C.M.R. 137 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952).
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tion 35 dealt with searches and seizures of an automobile without a warrant;
each of these cases relied on Carroll v. United States,3 6 which upheld a
search without a warrant because the vehicle might be moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant might be sought.3 7 The Doyle
case did not involve a search under circumstances demanding immediate
action to prevent the removal or disposal of property believed on reasonable
grounds to be criminal goods,38 because the accused had been arrested as a
result of another incident and was under guard.39 It has been said that
"what would constitute probable cause justifying the search of an auto-
mobile might be wholly insufficient to authorize the search of one's dwelling
place ... ." 40 The barracks and assigned locker space have been inter-
preted as constituting a soldier's dwelling place.41 Therefore, the locker
search in the Doyle case appears to have been unreasonable, at least on
principle.
The "existing military and navy law" to which the Court of Military
Appeals referred in holding the search reasonable appears to have been
more correctly analyzed by the Board of Review in the Kofnetka case,
42
which also involved a search upon information from an eyewitness that
accused had stolen property in his locker. The Board of Review, although
finding the evidence admissible because conducted by an acting commanding
officer who had authority to order a search, rejected the contention that
an adjutant's search was lawful when based on an eyewitness' report. The
Board stated that ". .. except for cases involving a search of a motor
vehicle without a warrant, but upon probable cause based on reasonable
grounds . . . the fact that. a Federal official making a search acts on
reliable information or complaint as to the commission of an offense, does
not dispense with the necessity for obtaining proper authorization to con-
duct the search, particularly when a dwelling house or a building in the
nature of a dwelling is involved. . .. Assuming . . . reliable informa-
35. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Gilliam v. United States,
189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951); Pearson v. United States, 150 F.2d 219 (10th Cir.
1945).
36. 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
37. This type situation is expressly provided for in the Manual by one of the
listed examples of a lawful search. See text at note 83.
38. Cf. MEm. OPIxIoNs oF JAGA (1949-50) 352 (search of bag carried by
accused at night in a black-marketing area after misleading response to question of
MP concerning contents of bag, held legal because not unreasonable under Fourth
Amendment) ; BuLLET N OF JAGA, VOL. II 1943 § 264 (search of automobiles leav-
ing military post upon well-founded reports they were being used to remove govern-
ment property, held reasonable).
39. Even an automobile cannot be searched without a warrant where the owner
is in jail. Hart v. United States, 162 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1947).
40. Pearson v. United States, 150 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir. 1945).
41. United States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R. 773, 779 n.6 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952)
(airman may assert an objection to a search without his consent and without proper
authorization of the locker space assigned to him in a government barracks in which
he is quartered, unless it is a search made in accordance with military custom or is
a routine formation).
42. United States v. Kofnetka, supra note 41.
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tion, or even probable cause . . in making his search, it is clear that the
wall locker searched in this case does not fall within the exception of the
motor vehicle cases . . .where immediate action is necessary. There
were no special considerations shown in regard to accused's wall locker
which would have rendered futile a search conducted after a delay long
enough to have procured authorization for the particular search from the
commanding officer." The federal rule exempts obtaining a search warrant
only where the search is incident to a valid arrest 43 or in extraordinary
or exceptional circumstances 44 making it impractical to secure a search
warrant through orderly procedure. 45 The burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it.40 Applying these same rules to the
Doyle case, it seems that that search was unreasonable because no excep-
tional circumstances were shown, concerning the stolen goods in the locker
belonging to the accused, which would authorize a search without a war-
rant. Since in federal courts the decision as to when the right of privacy
is to yield to the right of search is generally made by a responsible judicial
officer, it would appear proper that the question of when the right of
privacy in a sailor's locker is to yield to the right of search should be an-
swered by a responsible officer and not by a disciplinary representative as
the Doyle case permits.
4T
By limiting the inadmissibility to unlawful searches "conducted or in-
stigated by persons acting under authority of the United States" the Manual,
like the rules of the federal courts, does not exclude evidence obtained as
a result of an unlawful search or seizure by private persons or state officers
if made independent of any co-operation with federal or military officers.48
43. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (whether a warrant is
required before making a search after a lawful arrest depends upon the reasonableness
of the search rather than solely upon the practicability of procuring a search
warrant).
44. But cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (detecting odor of
opium coming from accused's hotel room is not a sufficiently exceptional circumstance
to legalize a search without a warrant).
45. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (reason to believe narcotics law
was being violated is not sufficient to authorize a search of hotel room even though
narcotics were found) ; Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952).
46. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ; McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948).
47. This is particularly true when in cases of searches occurring within a mili-
tary installation the power to authorize and to execute are in the commanding officer.
See note 16 upra.
48. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (constitutional guaranties against
unreasonable searches and seizures not violated where incriminating papers intro-
duced as evidence were stolen by private persons who turned them over to federal
authorities); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (Fourth Amendment
not applicable to unauthorized seizures of papers and property by municipal police
officers not acting under any claim of federal authority) ; Cannon v. United States,
166 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1948) (evidence illegally obtained by state prohibition agents
admissible in federal prosecution). But cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78
(1949) (it is a search by a federal official if he participated in it before the object
of the search was completely accomplished) ; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28,
32 (1927) (a federal search exists where federal prohibition agent assisted state
officers when requested, hoping that something would be disclosed of official interest
to him).
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Thus an unauthorized search of an accused's locker by a private first class 49
or other noncommissioned officer 50 made for the purpose of recovering
his property, rather than by disciplinary or law enforcement agents, is not
within the rule making evidence obtained thereby inadmissible in a court-
martial. But if the unauthorized search is made by members of a law
enforcement agency acting in that capacity the evidence obtained is in-
admissible.5i Since both commissioned and noncommissioned officers are
charged generally with certain responsibilities and authority, any searches
made by them while acting in that capacity and for the best interests of
the service would be under authority of the United States.52 If the accused
were to acquiesce in a superior's demands or orders, given for the purpose
of recovering the superior's own property, it would be only reasonable to
consider it as under authority of the United States. To hold otherwise
would permit use of disciplinary authority as a subterfuge for evading this
exclusionary rule of evidence.
Wiretapping.-There have been no opinions dealing with the inad-
missiblity of evidence obtained as a result of "wiretapping" in courts-
martial, but the history of the preparation of the Manual shows that no
attempt was made to lay down any independent military rules to be fol-
lowed by courts-martial with respect to this evidence. Thus, resort must
be made tothe federal law -s which "appears to rest solely upon a statutory
foundation which may be shaken in the future by amendatory legislation." 54
Fruits of an Illegal Search.-Not only is evidence obtained by illegal
searches and seizures inadmissible in courts-martial, but again paralleling
the federal rules,55 the Manual provides that "all evidence obtained through
information supplied by such illegally obtained evidence is likewise inad-
missible." This policy of preventing the subversion of the search and
49. United States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R. 773, 778 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951). This
private first class was the eye witness referred to in text at note 42.
50. United States v. Moorlegham, 4 C.M.R. (AF) 549, 552 (AF Bd. of Rev.
1951); cf. United States v. Gilbert, 5 C.M.R. 708 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
51. United States v. Thomas, 4 C.M.R. 729, 732 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952) (CID
agent); United States v. Cook, 1 C.M.R. 850, 853 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951) (OSI
agent); United States v. Bundy, 2 C.M.R. (AF) 809, 816 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950)
(air policeman).
52. United States v. Gosnell, 3 C.M.R. 646, 658 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952) (search
by officer as "Officer of the Day" illegal) ; United States v. Darby, 2 C.M.R. (AF)
200 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1949) (officer calling at accused's residence to secure accused's
military issue uniform for use in the stockade in accordance with routine procedure
was acting under authority of the United States).
53. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), appears to be the clearest
expression of the federal rule, which is that any evidence by federal officers as to
interstate communications intercepted by the tapping of telephone or telegraph wires
is inadmissible in a federal court because of the provisions of the Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934 which prohibit any person not authorized by the sender from
intercepting any communication and divulging or publishing the contents, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.
54. LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, M.C.M., 1951 240.
55. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), states that
illegally obtained evidence shall not be used at all.
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seizure rule by indirection has been consistently followed. Thus subse-
quent confessions dealing with the property illegally seized 56 and testimony
regarding an illegal search 57 have been held inadmissible. Under the prior
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1949, where the provisions were not so explicit,
it had been held that evidence obtained by a commanding officer's search
was admissible regardless of the source of information which impelled him
to make the search.58 This interpretation is changed under the present
Manual where "the admissibility of evidence obtained by a search made or
authorized by a commanding officer may not be determined wholly apart
from the information which prompted it." 59 The courts-martial like the
federal courts have recognized an exception in applying the basic rule that
illegally obtained evidence shall not be used at all. Where the same evi-
dence is obtained independently from both a lawful source and an unlaw-
ful source, such evidence is admissible. 0 Thus, government property seized
by government agents under a valid search warrant is admissible in courts-
martial despite a prior illegal search revealing the same property, where
the second search was based on information from independent sources
known prior to the first illegal search.61
EXAMPLES OF LAWFUL SEARCHES
In addition to proscribing generally the use of evidence obtained by
means of unlawful searches, the Manual lists specific examples of searches
which are to be considered lawful for the purpose of admitting the evidence
obtained thereby.
11 152 provides that "a search conducted in accordance with the au-
thority granted by a lawful search warrant" is a lawful search. Such a
search has always been considered lawful in court-martial cases, although
there is a difference between on-post and off-post searches.0 In off-post
56. United States v. Cook, 1 C.M.R. 850, 853 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951) (accused's
pretrial statement inadmissible because obtained as a result of exhibiting, the proceeds
of an illegal search and is therefore touched by the same taint of illegality) ; United
States v. Edwards, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 540, 544 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950) (accused's
confession dealing with property illegally seized as a result of an unlawful search
held inadmissible in evidence); United States v. Darby, 2 C.M.R. (AF) 200, 206
(AF Bd. of Rev. 1949) (evidence of voluntary confession inadmissible since inculpa-
tory statements stemmed from an illegal search and seizure).
57. United States v. Thomas, 4 C.M.R. 729, 732 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952) (testi-
mony of CID agent'with reference to an unlawful search of accused held inadmis-
sible). But cf. United States v. Rhodes, C.M. 354858 (A Bd. of Rev., Sept. 8, 1952)
(statement made that the preceding unlawful search referred to in the Manual, see
text at note 28 supra, means wire tapping).
58. United States v. Worley, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 424 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950).
59. United States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R. 773, 778 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
60. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), recognizes
that evidence obtained in this fashion does not become inaccessible, because where
"knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like
any others."
61. United States v. Allen, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 33 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950).
62. See note 16 mtpra. For the purposes of this discussion, "on-post" will be
used to indicate on an armed forces post, station or reservation in the United States
and "off-post" will be used to indicate outside such areas.
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searches of military personnel and their property the general civil require-
ments obtain.6 If the off-post search is made by state officials alone, with-
out such cooperation of federal or armed forces personnel as to make it a fed-
eral search,64 any evidence obtained is admissible, since, regardless of the va-
lidity of the state warrant, the search was not made by persons acting under
authority of the United States.65 A lawful federal or state search warrant
which would authorize a federal or military off-post search in the United
States must be based upon an affidavit of reasonable grounds and the ap-
plication must conform to the federal standard required for search war-
rants. 6 Thus, a federal agent may lawfully obtain and use a state search
warrant providing the federal standards are met, 7 or he may obtain and use
a federal search warrant issued by the federal district court having juris-
diction of the area to be searched.6 8
If an on-post search is made under authority of a search warrant in-
stead of being authorized by a commanding officer, a federal search warrant
would probably have to be obtained unless the state's reserved right to
serve civil and criminal process within federal areas purchased with its
63. DIGEST OV OPINIONS OF JAGA, 1912-1940 § 395(27) (C.M. 161760 1924);
(1941); BULLETIN oF JAGA, VoL II, 1944, 512 (C.M. 264149 1944); United
States v. Darby, 2 C.M.R. (AF) 200, 204 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1949).
64. Mere participation in a state search by a federal agent as a private person
and not as a federal enforcement agent does not render it a federal undertaking, but
when the federal agent participates under color of his federal office the search is a
joint operation of the local and federal officers. See note 48 supra. The fact that
military personnel accompany civil police to identify the government property for
which the state search warrant was issued does not render it an illegal search and
seizure. Richardson v. Zuppann, 81 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 174 F.2d
829 (3d Cir. 1949) (proper for police duly authorized to make a search to take along
military persons for identification of the property for which the warrant was issued) ;
Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943)
(army agent accompanied Philippine police to identify secret U.S. Army maps for
which valid search warrant had been issued).
65. United States v. Gilbert, 5 C.M.R. 708 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. Weinberg v. United States, 126 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.
1942) (to justify a search by federal officers, it is necessary to obtain a warrant from
a proper official upon probable cause supported by affidavit, naming or describing
person and particularly describing property and place to be searched, and the war-
rant must state probable cause for its issue, names of persons whose affidavits were
taken in support of it, the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized). United States v. Whitler, 5 C.M.R. 458, 462 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952);
United States v. Allen, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 33, 40 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950) (search by
OSI agent under federal search warrant held lawful); United States v. McKinney,
1 C.M.R. (AF) 625, 635 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1949); Harris v. United States, 117 F.2d
988 (6th Cir. 1941). In cases of federal searches under state search warrants it is
not necessary to inquire whether the warrant was good under state law where the
requirements for a federal search warrant are not met. Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28, 29 (1927). Search warrants procured in accordance with the requirements
of the local foreign law will authorize military searches of residences of armed forces
personnel which are located in friendly foreign countries and not within the confines
of any military reservation, even though the warrants are obtained "by information
on oath" rather than by affidavits of reasonable grounds. United States v. Whitler,
5 C.M.R. 458, 464 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
67. United States v. Darby, 2 C.M.R. (AF) 200 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1949).
68. Cf. Weinberg v. United States, 126 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1942) (search and
seizure of property in Southern District of New York illegal where made pursuant
to order of federal district court in Michigan).
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consent is interpreted to include issuance of a search warrant. 9 The inter-
play between federal and state areas is illustrated by a case where civilian
police obtained a warrant (presumably a state warrant) to search a car
which they believed contained stolen seat covers and which belonged to a
sailor who was already under naval arrest. A stolen master-at-arms' badge
was found in the car during the search which occurred outside the naval
station while both the accused and the station master-at-arms were
present.70 The Court of Military Appeals held this evidence admissible
because it was seized during a search conducted under the authority of a
lawful state search warrant. If the car was actually on property within
the federal area, possibly the state warrant was not valid because it might
not have been within the right reserved to the state over the federal area.
Even if the search was conducted off-post, if there was sufficient participa-
tion by the master-at-arms to make it a federal search,71 the court should
have determined whether in the issuance of the state search warrant the
federal requirements were met.
A second example of a lawful search is:
"A search of an individual's person, of the clothing he is wearing,
and of the property in his immediate possession or control, conducted
as an incident of lawfully apprehending him."
This example is listed for the first time in the present Manual, but the
principle involved has long been assumed by the military.72 Actually it
is nothing more than an adaptation of the federal rules of the Harris and
Rabinowitz cases 73 to military terminology-apprehension instead of arrest.
In other sections of the Manual, apprehension is defined as the taking into
custody of a person and it may be effected by clearly notifying the person
to be apprehended that he is thereby taken into custody. Custody is that
restraint of free locomotion caused by corporeal and forcible taking into
custody or by that "control exercised in the presence of the prisoner by
official acts or orders." 74 The control exercised by an officer's official
69. For discussion of jurisdiction within federal areas see Note, Federal Areas:
The Confusion of a Jurisdictional-Geographical Dicwtomy, 101 U. OF PA. L. REV.
124 (1952).
70. United States v. Doyle, 4 C.M.R. 137, 141 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952). Al-
though the report states the search occurred outside the station it is not clear whether
it was actually on government property because parking areas are frequently pro-
vided for naval personnel outside the gates and fence of the naval station. These areas
are still on government property because they are within the territory purchased
from the state.
71. See note 64 supra. But cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949);
Cannon v. United States, 166 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1948) (no participation either active
or tacit) ; United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 630 (D.C. Ore. 1925) (federal officers
not present to assist).
72. Mzmo. OPINIo Ns OF JAGA 1949-50 368.
73. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search of one room office
lawful when incident to arrest) ; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947)
(search without a warrant which was incident to an arrest may extend beyond the
person to include the premises under his immediate control).
74. See United States v. Gosnell, 3 C.M.R. 646, 650 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
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order to an airman to accompany the officer to the airman's barracks has
been held sufficient apprehension under this example of a lawful search."
The Court of Military Appeals and the boards of review, following the
federal cases, 76 have been alert to require probable cause for apprehending
the accused and to prevent the apprehension from being used as a subterfuge
to make a search without a warrant.7 7  Where CID agents raiding a Jap-
anese hotel for violations of the narcotics law found a hypodermic needle
and syringe in accused's uniform jacket hanging on a wall hook, an unlaw-
ful search and seizure resulted since the accused was not lawfully appre-
hended until after the search and there was no probable cause for taking
the accused into custody until after the discovery of the contraband goods.
78
Military searches were found not incident to an arrest and therefore un-
lawful where an OSI agent told the accused to step outside to the agent's
jeep and empty his pockets, 79 and where an accused had been held in arrest
by a town marshal for more than two hours before the search was made
by the Air Police.80 The meaning of the term "property in his immediate
possession or control" was narrowly construed so as to hold illegal a search
of accused's wall locker in his barracks, because the barracks were not
within accused's immediate possession or control when he was appre-
hended in a latrine building located fifty yards from the barracks. 8 '
Whether or not the latrine is to be considered essential to everyday living
in the barracks so as to include both within the concept of a "house" or
"living quarters," this decision is typical of the extreme care taken by some
boards of review 82 to protect the accused where search and seizure prob-
lems have arisen.
The third listed example of a lawful search is:
"A search under circumstances demanding immediate action to
prevent the removal or disposal of property believed on reasonable
grounds to be criminal goods."
This is an adoption of the federal rule which permits a search of a motor
vehicle without a warrant, when performed upon probable cause based
75. Ibid.
76. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 (1948) ("... the Government
is obliged to justify the arrest by the search and at the same time to justify the
search by the arrest. This will not do."); McKInght v. United States, 183 F.2d
977 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (arrest based on warrant does not authorize search when
arrest is mere pretext for search).
77. United States v. Florence, 5 C.M.R. 48, 53 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952); cf.
United States v. Ward, 2 C.M.R. 688 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951) (where accused was
apprehended attempting to leave the base with a false pass and' there were several
indications that the automobile he was driving was stolen, a search of the automobile
glove compartment was held incident to a legal arrest).
78. United States v. Thomas, 4 C.M.R. 729 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
79. United States v. Cook, 1 C.M.R. 850 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
80. United States v. Bundy, 2 C.M.R. (AF) 809 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950);
accord, United States v. Edwards, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 540 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950).
81. United States v. Gosnell, 3 C.M.R. 646 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952). Contra:
United States v. Stein & Sizemore, C.M. 349776 (A Bd. of Rev., Apr. 28, 1952).
82. See text at note 33 supra.
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on reasonable grounds.13 The boards of review have indicated that the
words "under circumstances demanding immediate action to prevent the
removal or disposal of property" will be narrowly interpreted.8 4 A typical
position was taken in United States v. Thonas s5 where the evidence in-
dicated that during a narcotics raid accused's uniform jacket was searched.
The Board of Review finding "no invitation to search, no consent, no at-
tempt at flight, no threat to dispose of the implements-no reason at all why
permission to search could not have been obtained from proper authority"
held the search unlawful. This decision is analogous to Johnson v. United
States,s 6 where the Supreme Court held illegal a search without a warrant
where a federal agent detected the odor of burning opium coming from a
hotel room and entered without a search warrant. The requirement that
the property must be "believed on reasonable grounds to be criminal goods"
eliminates the subterfuge of asking without good cause for a soldier to give
his consent to a search and if he refused, then to claim that circumstances
demanded immediate action to prevent the removal of property.s 7 It has
been stated that "the test of whether [the conditions listed in the third
example] . . . have been met is determined objectively after the search
is made and in view of all of the known circumstances existing at that time.
The test will never be a subjective determination of how the situation ap-
peared to the person making the search at the time of the search." 8
A similar treatment has been given to another example of a lawful
search listed in the Manual:
"A search made with the freely given consent of the owner in
possession of the property searched."
There probably is more reason to question consent to a search given by a
soldier to a superior in military life than where consent is given by a civilian
83. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (search of automobile with-
out a warrant but upon probable cause that the law is being violated held lawful) ;
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (search without a warrant of
a vehicle which may be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction is lawful). But cf.
Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952).
84. United States v. Gosnell, 3 C.M.R. 646, 657 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951) (search
unlawful where accused in custody of air police and air police are available to
prevent access by accomplices to locker) ; United States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R.
773, 779 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952) ("no special considerations shown in regard to
accused's wall locker which would have rendered futile a search conducted after a
delay long enough to have procured authorization for the particular search from
the commanding officer."); United States v. Cook, 1 C.M.R. 850, 853 (AF Bd. of
Rev. 1951) (although "accused was in the 'MATS terminal' [airport] when con-
fronted by the OSI agent, there was no showing that he was about to leave Eniwetock
Atoll so that immediate action was necessary"); United States v. Bundy, 2
C.M.R. (AF) 809, 816 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950) (immediate action not imperative
where accused was previously in town-marshal's custody for three hours and vehicle
was not under accused's immediate control).
85. 4 C.M.R. 729 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
86. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
87. Accord, United States v. Trolinger, 5 C.M.R. 447, 452 (AF Bd. of Rev.
1952); United States v. Thomas, 4 C.M.R. 729, 732 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
88. United States v. Gosnell, 3 C.M.R. 646, 657 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
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to a police officer; a soldier generally realizes that his superiors have a
stronger grip on his future in the way of promotions and type of duty assign-
ments, and there exists a general misconception as to the limits of a supe-
rior's authority. Courts-martial as well as federal courts 89 do not readily
find actions of an accused that constitute consent to a search of private
property and homes. In United States v. Kofnetka 1o there was held to be
no voluntary consent by the accused to two searches since he did not know
of them, and to a third search because he was "informed by the command-
ing officer that the latter intended to make the third one." It was stated:
"Consent to a search is not lightly to be implied merely because a person
peaceably submits, either to what he believes to be a lawful search, or to a
show of force or authority." The cases indicate that "freely given consent"
will not be readily found.9 '
The concluding example of a lawful search is stated by the Manual as:
"A search of property which is owned or controlled by the United
States and is under the control of an armed force, or of property
which is located within a military installation or in a foreign country
or in occupied territory and is owned, used, or occupied by persons
subject to military law or to the law of war, which search has been
authorized by a commanding officer (including an officer in charge)
having jurisdiction over the place where the property is situated or,
if the property is in a foreign country or in occupied territory, over
personnel subject to military law or to the law of war in the place
where the property is situated. The commanding officer may delegate
the general authority to order searches to persons of his command.
This example of authorized searches is not intended to preclude the
legality of searches made by military personnel in the areas outlined
above when made in accordance with military custom."
89. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921); United States v. Lantrip, 74 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D. Ark.
1948); United States v. Sully, 56 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). But cf. Davis
v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) ; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946);
United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
90. 2 C.M.R. 773, 777 n.1 (1951).
91. United States v. Heck, C.M. 354324 (A Bd. of Rev., Oct. 9, 1952) (no
consent where officer was informed of the intent of military police to conduct a raid
and he said "yes" and stepped aside to permit them to enter the officer's quarters) ;
United States v. Cook, 1 C.M.R. 850, 853 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951) (no consent where
accused was "more or less ordered" to empty his pockets and where he thought OSI
agent had authority to require him to submit to the search) ; United States v. Jones,
4 C.M.R. (AF) 218, 221 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950) (unauthorized OSI agent asked
accused if he would open his footlocker; when accused made no reply but did open
the footlocker, held, no consent given by accused). But cf. United States v. Johnson,
2 C.M.R. 644 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951) (acquiescence to policeman's visit when
accused was peaceably submitting to what he believed to be a lawful seizure was
not implied consent to seizure but was consent to search and evidence is admissible
because policeman could have testified to what he saw) ; United States v. Cornell, 2
C.M.R. (AF) 121, 125 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1949) (where accused led OSI agent to
closet after agent merely inquired about the presence of any government property, held,
a voluntary consent or invitation to the search of the closet).
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No doubt most searches are made under this example. The cases con-
struing the prior Manual, which made no mention of delegations, held that
delegations of the commanding officer's authority were not permitted.
92
However, the term commanding officer included lower unit commanders
with respect to searches in areas allocated to and set apart for the lower
units.93 Under the present Manual there are limitations on the authority
of the commanding officer to delegate this authority to order searches.
Thus, the Air Force Judge Advocate has stated that ". . . a 'delegation'
to each and every member of a squadron of Air Force policemen, could not
be sanctioned . . ." and a delegation of ". . the general power to
order searches to individuals primarily engaged in criminal investigative or
police work" would be undesirable and illegal.94 Both express and implied
delegations to squadron adjutants of the general authority to conduct
searches have been found reasonable delegations of authority.95
Although the Manual does not specifically require that the command-
ing officer's exercise of the power to order a search be based upon reason-
able grounds, the language in the cases and the statement of the Air Force
Judge Advocate clearly dictate this requirement. For example, the Air
Force Judge Advocate, in noting that a person to whom authority to order
a search has been delegated has the same authority to make the search
himself which the commanding officer had prior to the Manual, said: "The
former requirement for the exercise of the responsible official's [command-
ing officer] discretion in each case remains." Of particular note is the
indication that delegation should be restricted to those few persons "not
inflamed by the heat of the chase" whose rank, experience, position of trust,
responsibilities and discretion "ensure dispassionate and impartial considera-
tion in determination of the exercise of the delegated power." 96 The
Court of Military Appeals has neatly avoided delimiting the extent of the
commanding officer's power to authorize a search. In the Doyle case,
after referring to the differentiation between the power of a commanding
officer over military property and the power of a police officer to invade
a citizen's privacy, that court stated: "That there may be limitations upon
the former's power, we do not doubt. Insofar as the power bears on
criminal prosecutions, both trial courts and appellate forums are available
to insure that the commanding officer does not abuse his discretion to
92. United States v. Jones, 4 C.M.R. (AF) 218, 221 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951)
(commanding officer may not delegate his authority to authorize searches under
M.C.M., 1949) ; United States v. Hopkins, 4 C.M.R. (AF) 553, 560 (AF Jud. Council
1951) (commanding officer may not give a "blanket authorization" to make searches
under M.C.M., 1949).
93. United States v. Jones, 4 C.M.R. (AF) 218, 220 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
94. These statements are reported in United States v. Taylor, 1 C.M.R. 847,
849 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
95. United States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R. 773, 780 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952);
United States v. Taylor, 1 C.M.R. 847, 850 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
96. See United States v. Taylor, 1 C.M.R. 847, 849 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951)
(italics added).
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the extent that the rights of an individual are unduly impaired." o7 The
most recent search case decided by the Court of Military Appeals again finds
that court staying on the fence.98 In referring to prior court-martial cases
dealing with the plenary power of the commanding officer to order searches,
the court stated: "These authorities show good reasons, and many others
are suggested, as to why a seizure rule different from the one prescribed
for civilians is necessary in the military service. However, the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, treats more fully with search and
seizure and it may be the foundation for curtailing a commanding officer's
powers. For that reason at this time, we neither adopt nor reject the
former rule because in this instance the commanding officer's conduct did
not breach civilian principles. We are attempting to carry out the con-
gressional intent to grant to military personnel, whenever reasonably pos-
sible, the same rights and privileges accorded civilians." In keeping
with its desire to mold a pattern of rights which are labeled "military due
process," 09 the Court of Military Appeals when squarely faced with the
issue will probably decide that the exercise by the commanding officer of
his power to authorize military searches must be based upon reasonable
grounds.100
The example under discussion makes lawful those searches, when au-
thorized by a commanding officer, of the following property: that owned or
controlled by the United States and under the control of an armed force;
that located within a military installation and owned or used by persons
subject to military law."0 ' This gives a broad power to the commanding
officer which, if literally interpreted, would legalize searches of the uniform
and equipment being worn by persons subject to military law as well as
most other property on a military post. 02 In the past the Judge Advocate,
the Judicial Council, and the boards of review have assumed that the com-
manding officer, in the exercise of sound discretion, has authority to search
the person of a member of the military establishment because such authority
is indispensable to the maintenance of good order and discipline in any
military command."03 The cases are not put on the grounds that the prop-
erty searched was being used by persons subject to military law-which
97. United States v. Doyle, 4 C.M.R. 137, 140 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952).
98. United States v. Florence, 5 C.M.R. 48, 51 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952).
99. United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1951).
100. What amounts to reasonable grounds in a military context will have to be
determined on an ad hoc basis.
101. Although a search is authorized by a commanding officer under this example,
the evidence obtained may be inadmissible if the search was ordered because of
information obtained by a prior illegal search. United States v. Kofnetka, 2 C.M.R.
773, 778 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1952).
102. Under the post-World War II supply system changes, enlisted personnel
were given a yearly allowance for the purchase of uniforms. The uniforms might
then be considered "owned" by them, but still they are controlled by the armed
forces to the extent of regulations applicable to uniforms.
103. United States v. Florence, 5 C.M.R. 48, 50 (Ct. of Mil. App. 1952) ; United
States v. Rhodes, C.M. 354858 (A Bd. of Rev., Sept. 8, 1952); United States v.
Arteaga, 1 C.M.R. 632, 635 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
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would require authority from the commanding officer, probably based upon
reasonable grounds. Instead, they hold searches of the person lawful be-
cause made in accordance with military custom,10 4 the authority for which
may be found in the concluding sentence of this example.
The few court-martial cases which discuss military custom do not
clearly define the extent of its application. The legislative history indicates
that on military posts the normal civilian rule of search and seizure is not
followed because "frequently you could not find anybody to issue a war-
rant." 105 Another part of the Manual 10 6 states: "In its legal sense the
word 'custom' imports something more than a method of procedure or a
mode of conduct or behavior which is merely of frequent or usual occur-
rence. Custom arises out of long established practices which by common
consent have attained the force of law in the military or other community
affected by them. There can be no such thing as a custom that is contrary
to existing law or regulation. A custom which has not been adopted by
existing statute or regulation ceases to exist when its observance has been
long abandoned. Many customs of the service are now set forth in regula-
tions of the various armed forces." A search made in accordance with
custom does not require the authority of the commanding officer.110' It has
been stated that, "Through a devolution of command, certain officers and
noncommissioned officers have been authorized by custom to search and
order such searches as, for instance, 'a shake-down' search of an entire
group of men, or a search for 'overages' of clothing or equipment, or a
search of all vehicles leaving a command, and other like instances." 10s
Since such searches are generally made periodically and not called for the
particular purpose of seeking to discover evidence of a crime, there appears
to be no reason why they must be based upon reasonable grounds. There
is authority for limiting this type of search made in accordance with military
custom to those searches of a whole command or unit in general, and not
to include searches directed toward a specific person. 0 9 All of the searches
mentioned are confined to the barracks or exits of a command; thus the
indication is that a search of private family quarters located on a post will
not be permitted unless authorized by the commanding officer. However,
104. Ibid.
105. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on H.R.
2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1949).
106. M.C.M., 1951, ff 213a (dealing with breach of custom in violation of Article
134).
107. United States v. Rhodes, C.M. 354858 (A Bd. of Rev., Sept. 8, 1952)
(search in office of staff judge advocate on the authority of that officer who was
one of the commanding officer's special staff officers held legal because made in
accordance with well recognized customs of the service) ; United States v. Gosnell,
3 C.M.R. 646, 658 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
108. United States v. Gosnell, 3 C.M.R. 646, 658 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1951).
109. United States v. Edwards, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 540, 543 (AF Bd. of Rev. 1950):
"Barracks inspections and general 'shakedown' inspections which are not directed
toward a specific person or his effects and not called for the purpose in particular
of seeking to discover evidence of a crime, are routine formations. . . [E]idence
turned up during such an inspection is not objectionable upon the ground that it was
the subject of an unlawful search and seizure."
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where a staff officer is responsible for every detail relating to the conduct of
his office, it has been held that customs of the service authorize the staff
officer either to conduct or permit a search of his own office when made
upon probable cause.110
A recent board of review case "' contains a significant statement on the
proviso regarding searches made in accordance with military custom: "We
believe this proviso was intended to cover and make lawful searches directed
by other commanding officers, such as unit commanders, regimental com-
manders or division commanders, against persons and property under their
immediate jurisdiction. To consider the proviso as legalizing all searches
conducted within the military establishment would render the Manual's
prior provision on the subject of little efficacy." Thus, it is relatively
certain that neither a search directed at an individual alone without the
consent of the commanding or responsible staff officer nor a disguised search
of the whole'unit conducted for the purpose of making the individual search
will be held lawful under the guise of military custom. Possibly such prac-
tices are a method of procedure or mode of conduct of frequent occurrence,
but even so, it is not a long established practicd which by common consent
has attained the force of law in the military community." 2 Even in searches
of an individual's person or equipment by the commanding officer or
responsible staff officer, what little authority there is seems to require such
searches to be based upon probable cause or ordered in the exercise of
discretion. 31 If searches of the person based upon custom are upheld
without such a limitation, military personnel, in reality would have little
protection from unreasonable searches while on a military reservation. For
example, in case of a theft in a unit where one individual is suspected, but
there does not exist reasonable grounds upon which the commanding officer
could authorize a search of the individual, the unit commander would merely
have to order a "shake-down" inspection of the whole unit to have the
individual searched during the detailed search of all the members of the
unit. No doubt the armed forces will continue to claim the authority to
search a soldier's person, as well as his effects, when made in accordance
with military custom. Although such a claim is consistent with the defini-
tion of custom laid down in the Manual, it could easily be decided otherwise
by noting that if the President intended to give such a large grant of au-
thority to make a search of a soldier's person without apprehending him it
would have specifically been stated and not left to be implied from such a
vague cover-all term as "military custom." The fact that a search of an
individual's person when conducted as an incident of lawfully apprehending
him was specifically given as an example of a lawful search tends to give
further support to the idea that a search of in individual's person was not
intended to be authorized under the guise of military custom.
110. United States v. Rhodes, C.M. 354858 (A Bd. of Rev., Sept. 8, 1952).
111. United States v. Heck, C.M. 354324 (A Bd. of Rev., Oct. 9, 1952).
112. See text at note 107 supra.
113. See note 103 mtpra.
1953] SEARCH AND SEIZURE
SUMMARy
The rules of search and seizure applied in courts-martial are not bot-
tomed on any constitutional rights. These rules are patterned after and
generally follow the federal rules on the subject except for the plenary
power given the commanding officer and the legality of searches made solely
in accordance with military custom. Unfortunately the Court of Military
Appeals does not appear inclined to follow the careful distinctions and
narrow interpretations set forth by the boards of review in order to
protect the interests of the accused. It is well to remember that all these
rules are dealing with admissibility of evidence and probably the reason for
generally construing them narrowly is that military personnel are not
likely to take the chance of resisting a superior's orders during a search
of property. Under the design and application of these rules, armed
forces personnel are not forced to resist illegal searches and seizures to
secure protection during a trial, because evidence obtained as a result of
information secured in an illegal search is not admissible. The only ap-
parent danger is a possible decision that searches of the person made with-
out probable cause are justified as being in accordance with military custom.
